



Selected Flaws Hampering the Enforcement of the Insider Trading Prohibition by Key Role-Players in Zimbabwe

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Abstract: Insider trading is one of the illicit market abuse trading practices that are hampering the stability, viability, efficiency and integrity of the Zimbabwean financial markets. In this regard, it is submitted that the Zimbabwean anti-insider trading regulatory framework has not been very successful to date owing to various flaws and factors such as the gaps in the functions and regulatory powers of regulatory bodies, the lack of insider trading awareness and educational programmes, inadequate financial resources and the inconsistent co-operation between the regulatory bodies and other relevant enforcement authorities in Zimbabwe. These and other related flaws have culminated into various challenges such as poor market efficiency, poor market integrity, high market volatility and low public investor confidence in the Zimbabwean financial markets. This could further indicate that insider trading activities are still poorly regulated in Zimbabwe under the Securities Act 17 of 2004 [Chapter 24:25] as amended (Securities Act). Consequently, the article investigates the gaps and flaws in the current anti-insider trading regulatory framework under the Securities Act. This is done in order to recommend possible measures that could be employed by the relevant enforcement authorities, policy makers and other key role-players to effectively combat insider trading activities in the Zimbabwean financial markets.

Keywords: role-players; market integrity; flaws; insider trading; regulation

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1. Introduction

For the purposes of this article, insider trading is committed when, *inter alia*, an insider who has price-sensitive non-public information concludes illicit transactions in listed securities to which that information relates to the detriment of other ignorant investors and related persons (Osode, 2004, pp. 303; Botha, 1991, pp. 2-3). Insider trading is one of the illicit market abuse trading practices that are hampering the stability, viability, efficiency and integrity of the Zimbabwean financial markets (Saungweme, Ricardo & Pradeep, 2013, pp. 1631-1638; Munangagwa, 2009, pp. 110-128; also see Massawe & Kadilu, 2014, pp. 52-63; Cinar, 1999, pp. 345-353; Osode, 2000, pp. 239-263; Tomasic, 1991, pp. 121-143). In this regard, it is submitted that the Zimbabwean anti-insider trading regulatory framework has not been very successful to date owing to various flaws and factors such as the gaps in the functions and regulatory powers of regulatory bodies, the lack of insider trading awareness and educational programmes, inadequate financial resources and the inconsistent co-operation between the regulatory bodies and other relevant enforcement authorities in Zimbabwe (Mataruka & Mahombera, 2018, Mwenda, 1997, pp. 29-46; Saungweme, Ricardo & Pradeep, 2013, pp. 1631-1638; Munangagwa, 2009, pp. 110-128). These and other related flaws have culminated into various challenges such as poor market efficiency, poor market integrity, high market volatility and low public investor confidence in the Zimbabwean financial markets (Saungweme, Ricardo & Pradeep, 2013, pp. 1631-1638; Munangagwa, 2009, pp. 110-128; Mwenda, 1997, pp. 29-46). This could further indicate that insider trading activities are still poorly regulated in Zimbabwe under the Securities Act 17 of 2004 [Chapter 24:25] as amended (Securities Act). Consequently, the article investigates the gaps and flaws in the current anti-insider trading regulatory framework under the Securities Act. Accordingly, the role and effectiveness of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Zimbabwe (SECZ), the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) and the courts are examined in this article. This is done in order to recommend possible measures that could be employed by the relevant enforcement authorities, policy makers and other key role-players to effectively combat insider trading activities in the Zimbabwean financial markets (Chitimira, 2012, pp. 7-10; 101-103; Mwenda, 1996-1999, pp. 137-156). It is submitted that both the ZSE and the SECZ have not yet managed to timeously detect and combat all insider trading cases in the Zimbabwean financial markets since 1980 to date (Magaisa, 2006; Saungweme, Ricardo & Pradeep, 2013, pp. 1631-1638). Therefore, it is hoped that the government, the SECZ, the ZSE and the courts will co-operatively work together to effectively enforce the insider trading

prohibition in Zimbabwe in terms of the Securities Act to promote investor confidence, investor protection, market fairness, market integrity, market transparency in capital and securities markets, reduce systemic risk, prevent market abuse, fraud and financial crime, promote investor education and market efficiency in the Zimbabwean financial markets (section 4(1)(a)-(f) of the Securities Act; Saungweme, Ricardo & Pradeep, 2013, pp. 1631-1638; Karjala, 1982, pp. 627-650; Arshadi, 1998, pp. 70-84; Chitimira & Lawack, 2013, pp. 200-217; Spitz, 1989, pp. 265-290).

2. The Effectiveness of the SECZ

In terms of the Securities Act, the SECZ must promote investor protection in the Zimbabwean financial markets (section 4(1)(a) of the Securities Act). Moreover, the SECZ is required to prevent systemic risks in the Zimbabwean financial markets (section 4(1)(b) read with sections 88-94 of the Securities Act). This entails that the SECZ must adopt appropriate and adequate measures to encourage robust investor protection and ensure that all systemic risks are timeously detected and effectively curbed in the Zimbabwean financial markets. The SECZ is also obliged to promote market integrity and investor confidence in the Zimbabwean financial markets (section 4(1)(c) of the Securities Act). Additionally, the SECZ is mandated to prevent market manipulation, insider trading, fraud and other financial crimes in the Zimbabwean financial markets (section 4(1)(d) of the Securities Act). In this regard, it is submitted that the SECZ should effectively enforce the anti-insider trading prohibition so as to effectively promote market integrity and investor confidence in the Zimbabwean financial markets. This follows the fact that investors are usually attracted to financial markets that are free from market abuse practices such as market manipulation and insider trading. The SECZ must promote transparency in the Zimbabwean capital and securities markets (section 4(1)(e) of the Securities Act). Over and above, the SECZ is obliged to adopt adequate measures to promote investor education among all financial consumers in Zimbabwe to enable them to be aware of the negative effects of illicit trading practices such as insider trading, market manipulation, money laundering and other related financial crimes (section 4(1)(f) of the Securities Act). In terms of the Securities Act, the SECZ should also prohibit market participants, issuer of securities, licensed persons and other relevant persons from committing insider trading offences in the Zimbabwean financial markets (sections 4(1)(d) and 4(2) read with sections 88-94 of the Securities Act). The SECZ is further empowered to

regulate all the trading and/or dealing in any securities that are listed on the ZSE (section 4(2)(a) of the Securities Act). This is probably done to detect and curb market abuse activities and related illicit trading practices such as money laundering, front running, quote stuffing and high frequency trading (HFT) in the Zimbabwean financial markets. Nonetheless, the regulatory powers of the SECZ are merely limited to listed securities and as such, other illegal trading activities that are perpetrated by the offenders in unregulated markets are not expressly covered under the Securities Act.

The SECZ is empowered to oversee the registration, supervision and regulation of securities exchanges such as the ZSE in Zimbabwe (section 4(2)(b) of the Securities Act). This is probably done to foster compliance and co-operation between the SECZ, the ZSE and other role-players. In addition, the SECZ is required to license, supervise and regulate all licensed persons in order to foster compliance and high standards of professionalism and integrity on such persons in Zimbabwe (section 4(2)(c) of the Securities Act; see further Grundfest, 2016, pp. 1143-1188). The SEC is further required to encourage the development of free, fair and orderly capital and securities markets in Zimbabwe (section 4(2)(d) of the Securities Act; Grundfest, 2016, pp. 1143-1188). This enables the SECZ to boost foreign direct investments (FDI) and public investor confidence in the Zimbabwean financial markets. The SECZ is mandated to advise the government and/or policy makers on all matters relating to the trading and regulation of securities in Zimbabwe (section 4(2)(e) of the Securities Act). The SECZ may exercise any other function that is appropriate and relevant for the effective regulation of the Zimbabwean financial markets (section 4(2)(f) of the Securities Act). The SECZ enforces the insider trading prohibition and all insider trading offenders are liable to pay criminal penalties of a fine not exceeding level ten or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years or both the fine and imprisonment (section 90 of the Securities Act). Likewise, insider trading offenders are liable for civil penalties and/or remedies against the issuers of any affected securities or any holder of affected securities and/or any person who ignorantly traded in any affected securities before the relevant inside information was made public (section 91 read with section 105 of the Securities Act). However, the Securities Act does not expressly provide for the role of the SECZ in relation to the enforcement of the criminal penalties for insider trading in Zimbabwe. For instance, the Securities Act does not adequately provide for any specific insider trading hearings that could be conducted by the SECZ and/or the courts in Zimbabwe (section 90 read with sections 91; 103(5) and 105 of the Securities Act). Moreover, the Securities Act

merely provides that SECZ investigators shall have the same powers, rights and privileges as those that are conferred upon commissioners in terms of the Commissions of Inquiry Act [Chapter 10:07] 4 of 1941 as amended (“Inquiry Act”, see sections 9 to 13 and 15 read with section 103(5) of the Securities Act). This gap has somewhat impeded the effective enforcement of the anti-insider trading prohibition by both the SECZ and the courts in Zimbabwe to date. It should be noted that the Inquiry Act only regulates the commissions of inquiries that are established by the government to investigate any important matter of public interest (section 2 of the Inquiry Act; Rowe and McAllister, 2006, pp. 99-115). Obviously, the enforcement of the insider trading prohibition by the SECZ and/or the courts is not regarded as an important matter that requires a public inquiry in Zimbabwe (sections 88-94 of the Securities Act read with section 2 of the Inquiry Act). The Securities Act does not expressly provide specific rules and procedures on how insider trading investigations and hearings should be conducted by the SECZ and the courts respectively (sections 88-94 read with sections 100; 102-105 of the Securities Act). This gap has negatively affected the investigation and curbing of insider trading activities by the SECZ in Zimbabwe.

The SECZ is not statutorily empowered to enact its own mandatory rules that guide companies, investors, market participants, directors and shareholders on the disclosure of non-public price-sensitive inside information (sections 88-94 read with sections 100; 102-105 of the Securities Act; Osode, 2000, pp. 239-263; Chitimira, 2014, pp. 254-271). Issuers of securities come into possession of price-sensitive inside information from time to time, therefore, the disclosure of that information must be properly regulated (International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 2003, pp. 20-23). The proper disclosure of the relevant non-public price-sensitive inside information relating to listed securities by companies and other issuers of securities gives equal opportunities to all persons, investors and/or potential investors to trade on the basis of such information in the financial markets (Osode, 2000, pp. 239-263; Chitimira, 2014, pp. 254-271). Furthermore, the disclosure of the non-public price-sensitive inside information by companies, investors, market participants, directors and shareholders enhances financial markets efficiency by increasing the pool of the relevant information for market analysts and market participants in the Zimbabwean financial markets (Saungweme, Ricardo & Pradeep, 2013, pp. 1631-1638; Munangagwa, 2009, pp. 110-128; OECD, 2014, pp. 7-53). It is submitted that the failure of the Securities Act to expressly empower the SECZ to impose its own mandatory duties on companies, issuers of securities and other market participants to disclose any non-

public price-sensitive inside information that is likely to have a material effect on the price or value of listed securities has negatively affected the combating of insider trading in Zimbabwe to date.

The Securities Act does not expressly provide the aggrieved persons with the right to institute their own claims for damages (private rights of action) to claim insider trading damages directly from the offenders (sections 91 and 92 of the Securities Act; also see Chitimira, 2015, pp. 86–107; Loke, 2007, pp. 307-335). This flaw has statutorily denied the affected persons the right to directly claim their damages from the insider trading offenders. Consequently, affected persons are solely relying on the bureaucratic civil proceedings that are instituted by the SECZ. Furthermore, the Securities Act does not provide statutory guidelines on how successful claimants can get their damages from the SECZ (sections 91 and 92 read with sections 93-95 of the Securities Act; Hopt, 1986, pp. 383-400). As a result, the absence of adequate guidelines in the Securities Act on how insider trading victims can claim their damages from the SECZ has given rise to none and/or a minimal successful claimants of insider trading damages in Zimbabwe to date (Saungweme, Ricardo & Pradeep, 2013, pp. 1631-1638). This status *quo* is worsened by the fact that the Securities Act does not expressly provide the role of the SECZ in relation to actual calculable damages for insider trading (sections 91 and 92 of the Securities Act; Wang, 2009, pp. 1-32). Moreover, the Securities Act does not expressly state how the SECZ may calculate the damages that are awarded to the insider trading victims after a successful claim (sections 88-94 read with sections 100; 102-105 of the Securities Act).

Very few employees in the SECZ surveillance department have the relevant expertise in securities and financial markets law. Consequently, this status *quo* has adversely affected the effective enforcement of the insider trading prohibition in Zimbabwe to date (Madende, 2015, pp. 2-80). For instance, since 2016, the SECZ has been investigating Messina Investments (Private) Limited without any successful prosecution and/or settlement for its alleged unlawful acquisition of shares in CFI Holdings during a closed period in July 2015 (Madende, 2015, pp. 2-80; Flynn, 1992, pp. 107-139). Both the lack of financial resources and the lack of employees with adequate and relevant expertise in securities and financial markets law have culminated in the poor investigation, prosecution and/or settlement of the aforesaid case (Muronzi, 2017; Misra, 2011, pp. 162-168). In this regard, it is submitted that the surveillance department of the SECZ must be well funded and have employees with the relevant expertise in securities and financial markets law

so as to enhance the investigation, settlement and prosecution of insider trading cases in Zimbabwe (SECZ, 2017). The other option is for the SECZ to establish a specific market abuse department that focuses on the detection, prevention and investigation of market abuse activities such as insider trading in the Zimbabwean financial markets.

3. The Effectiveness of the ZSE

The ZSE should be playing a vital role in the detection and prevention of insider trading practices in the Zimbabwean financial markets (Mataruka & Mahombera, 2018). However, the role of the ZSE has been sometimes marred by the fact that the Securities Act does not expressly provide for the duties of the ZSE in relation to the investigation, detection and combating of insider trading activities in Zimbabwe (sections 88-94 read with sections 100; 102-105 of the Securities Act). Although the ZSE generally oversees the trading of securities and financial instruments in the Zimbabwean financial markets, it appears that the ZSE does not have sufficient electronic surveillance systems in place to detect, investigate and prevent insider trading activities in the Zimbabwean financial markets (Mataruka & Mahombera, 2018). It is submitted that the SECZ merely relies on tip-offs about insider trading activities from the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and other market participants because the ZSE does not have adequate electronic surveillance systems to detect all suspicious trading activities that could sometimes give rise to insider trading and other market abuse practices in the Zimbabwean financial markets (SEC Annual Report, 2012; ZSE, 2015). Accordingly, most investors are currently reluctant to invest in Zimbabwe because the ZSE is, *inter alia*, still struggling to effectively detect and curb insider trading and other illegal trading practices in the Zimbabwean financial markets.

Furthermore, the ZSE does not adequately regulate the disclosure of non-public price-sensitive inside information through its ZSE Listing Requirements (section 3.69(i)-(iv) of the ZSE Listing Requirements; see further related discussion by Chitimira, 2014, pp. 110-123; Bhana, 1987, pp. 200-208). For instance, the ZSE Listing Requirements have so far failed to effectively prohibit directors and other market participants from dealing unlawfully with non-public price-sensitive inside information in listed securities in the Zimbabwean financial markets (section 3.69(i)-(iv) of the ZSE Listing Requirements; also see Chitimira, 2014, pp. 110-123). This is exacerbated by the fact that the ZSE Listing Requirements are mainly

restricted to natural persons despite the fact that juristic persons can also commit insider trading through natural persons (section 3.69(i)-(iv) of the ZSE Listing Requirements). Moreover, although the ZSE Listing Requirements could help to curb insider trading, they do not provide specific penalties that can be imposed on the insider trading offenders. The ZSE Listing Requirements also do not provide adequate procedures that must be followed by the issuers of securities prior to, during and after the publication of the price-sensitive inside information in the Zimbabwean financial markets (sections 3.3-3.22 of the ZSE Listing Requirements).

4. The Effectiveness of the Relevant Courts

In Zimbabwe, it appears that the courts are statutorily empowered to enforce the civil and criminal sanctions for insider trading under the Securities Act (see sections 90-93). Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the courts may also enforce administrative sanctions against the insider trading offenders in Zimbabwe (see sections 90-93 read with sections 100; 102-105 of the Securities Act). Moreover, the Securities Act does not expressly specify the type of courts that are empowered to hear insider trading cases in Zimbabwe. It remains uncertain whether the regional magistrate courts (section 117 read with sections 88-94 of the Securities Act) and/or the High Courts have jurisdiction to hear insider trading cases in Zimbabwe. This obscurity has negatively affected the prosecution and settlement of insider trading cases by the courts in Zimbabwe to date. For instance, very minimal cases of insider trading have been timeously prosecuted and/or settled in the courts owing to the backlog of other cases in the courts and insufficient magistrates, judges and/or other court officials with the relevant expertise to adjudicate on insider trading cases in Zimbabwe (Mataruka & Mahombera, 2018, page number unknown). Since the enactment of the Securities Act, no single insider trading case has been successfully prosecuted and/or settled in the Zimbabwean courts to date (Mataruka & Mahombera, 2018, page number unknown). In this regard, it is submitted that regional magistrate courts and High Courts should be expressly and statutorily empowered under the Securities Act to adjudicate upon insider trading cases in Zimbabwe. The relevant courts should be well resourced and equipped with sufficient magistrates, judges and/or other court officials that have the relevant expertise to hear insider trading cases in Zimbabwe (see sections 90-93 read with sections 100; 102-105 of the Securities Act; Chitimira, 2014, pp. 110-123). The other option is for the policy makers and/or

relevant authorities to establish more commercial courts or specialized market abuse courts to prioritize insider trading and other commercial crimes in Zimbabwe. To date, no commercial courts or market abuse courts are effectively operational in Zimbabwe (Mataruka & Mahombera, 2018).

5. The Inconsistent Co-operation Between Enforcement Authorities

It appears that the SECZ, the ZSE, the courts and other relevant role-players responsible for enforcing the anti-insider trading prohibition in the Zimbabwean financial markets do not always co-operate effectively with each other when executing their duties (Mataruka & Mahombera, 2018). For instance, the ZSE has to date struggled to detect and alert the SECZ about any suspicious trading activities and all insider trading cases for further investigation. Moreover, the ZSE is not able to effectively fulfil its regulatory obligations and refer all possible insider trading activities to the SECZ for further investigation because it does not have adequate electronic surveillance systems to detect all illicit trading activities that occur in the Zimbabwean financial markets (Mataruka & Mahombera, 2018). This is worsened by the lack of adequate resources and the adoption of non-robust preventative and co-operative measures on the part of both the SECZ and the ZSE. Moreover, it appears that there is no formal co-operation memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the SECZ and the ZSE. Likewise, there is no formal co-operation MOU between the SECZ and the ZRP as well as between the ZSE and the ZRP. This suggests that there is no co-operation between the SECZ, the ZSE and the ZRP. There also appears to be no formal support that is rendered by the both the SECZ and the ZSE to the relevant courts, especially on matters relating to insider trading offences.

It is submitted that the SECZ has some co-operation with other regional regulatory bodies such as the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA), the Namibia Financial Institutions Supervisory Authority (NAMFISA) and the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority (NBFIRA) (Mataruka & Mahombera, 2018, page number unknown). In this regard, it is submitted that the SECZ usually holds regular meetings with other similar regional regulatory institutions to strengthen the regulation of financial markets in order to curb illicit trading activities such as insider trading, money laundering, front running, quote stuffing and HFT in the Zimbabwean financial markets and related markets in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Coomber, 2010, pp. 5-55; Anderson,

2015, pp. 795-810; Dalley, 1998, pp. 1289-1353; Dent, 2013, pp. 247-273). However, since the enactment of the Securities Act, the SECZ has not yet investigated, prosecuted or settled any regional and/or international insider trading case (Mataruka & Mahombera, 2018; also see Austin, 2016, pp. 15-296). It is also uncertain whether the SECZ has concluded any co-operation MOU with similar regional and international regulatory bodies to enhance the robust enforcement of the anti-insider trading prohibition in the Zimbabwean financial markets (Mataruka & Mahombera, 2018, page number unknown Linciano, 2003, pp. 199-218; Palan & Stockl, 2017, pp. 104-129; Perino, 2019, pp. 951-1004; Pillai, Shah & Kar, 2014, pp. 249-258). As discussed above, it is clear that there is a poor and inconsistent co-operative relationship between the SECZ and other regulatory bodies and/or role-players in Zimbabwe and other international countries (Beny, 2007, pp. 237-300; Gething, 1998, pp. 607-627; Gilson & Kraakman, 1984, pp. 549-644).

6. The Lack of Insider Trading Awareness and Educational Programmes

It should be noted that the SECZ has so far failed to provide all the relevant persons with adequate investor education in relation to the effects of market abuse practices such as insider trading in the Zimbabwean financial markets (section 4(1)(f) of the Securities Act; also see Dooley, 1980, pp. 1-83; Douglas, 1988, pp. 127-142; Figueroa, 2014, pp. 166-212). Thus, the SECZ is still struggling to comply with one of its statutory obligations under the Securities Act to promote investor education in the Zimbabwean financial markets (section 4(1)(f) of the Securities Act). Accordingly, the SECZ should effectively promote appropriate educational programmes to equip investors, potential investors and other market participants to know more about insider trading activities so as to enable them to shun such activities in the Zimbabwean financial markets (Periyasamy & Kumar, 2016, pp. 21-23). The SECZ should further adopt insider trading awareness and educational programs for employees of listed companies, investors, potential investors, high school and tertiary students, market participants and the general public to discourage and curb insider trading practices in the Zimbabwean financial markets (Mataruka & Mahombera, 2018). This could be enforced by the SECZ through market abuse awareness workshop programmes, media awareness campaigns, advertisements, short courses and informative pamphlets that are made accessible to all market participants and other relevant persons so as to combat insider trading in the Zimbabwean financial markets.

7. Concluding Remarks

As indicated above, various gaps and flaws in the Zimbabwean anti-insider trading regulatory framework are hampering the stability, viability, efficiency and integrity of the Zimbabwean financial markets. Owing to this, the Zimbabwean anti-insider trading regulatory framework has to date failed to effectively combat insider trading activities in the Zimbabwean financial markets (Mataruka & Mahombera, 2018; also see Austin, 2016, pp. 15-296). Consequently, the flaws in relation to the functions and regulatory powers of the SECZ, the lack of insider trading awareness and educational programmes, inadequate financial resources and the inconsistent co-operation between the regulatory bodies and other relevant enforcement authorities in Zimbabwe should be adequately addressed. Accordingly, the regulatory powers of the SECZ under the Securities Act should be revamped so that they are not merely limited to the combating of insider trading in respect of listed securities alone. This will enable the SECZ to combat insider trading and other illegal trading activities that are perpetrated by the offenders in both regulated and unregulated markets under the Securities Act (Chitimira, 2014, pp. 110-123; Mataruka & Mahombera, 2018).

Moreover, it is submitted that the surveillance department of the SECZ must be well funded and have employees with the relevant expertise in securities and financial markets law so as to enhance the investigation, settlement and prosecution of insider trading cases in Zimbabwe (SECZ, 2017, pp. page number unknown). The SECZ should also consider establishing a specific market abuse department that focuses on the detection, prevention and investigation of market abuse activities such as insider trading in the Zimbabwean financial markets. The Securities Act should be amended to enact provisions that empower the SECZ to enact its own mandatory rules that guide companies, investors, potential investors, directors, shareholders and other market participants on the disclosure of non-public price-sensitive inside information (Guttentag, 2017, pp. 520-570). Furthermore, the Securities Act should be amended to enact provisions that expressly provide for the duties of the ZSE in relation to the investigation, detection and combating of insider trading activities in Zimbabwe (sections 88-94 read with sections 100; 102-105 of the Securities Act; see further Öberg, 2014, pp. 111-138). The ZSE should acquire sufficient electronic surveillance systems to enhance the effective detection, investigation and prevention of insider trading activities in the Zimbabwean financial markets (Jooste, 2000, pp. 283-286).

The Securities Act should be amended to enact provisions that expressly provide for administrative sanctions for insider trading offences in Zimbabwe. Such provisions should empower the courts to enforce administrative sanctions against the insider trading offenders in Zimbabwe (see sections 90-93 read with sections 100; 102-105 of the Securities Act; also see Van Deventer, 2009, pp. 3-4; Van Osselaer, 2017, pp. 399-424). Moreover, the Securities Act should be amended to enact provisions that expressly specify the type of courts that are empowered to hear insider trading cases in Zimbabwe. Such courts should be well resourced and equipped with sufficient magistrates, judges and/or other court officials that have the relevant expertise to hear insider trading cases in Zimbabwe (Chitimira, 2014, pp. 110-123). It is further submitted that the policy makers and/or relevant authorities should establish more commercial courts and/or specialized market abuse courts to prioritize insider trading and other commercial crimes in Zimbabwe. The SECZ should further adopt insider trading awareness and educational programs for employees of listed companies, investors, potential investors, high school and tertiary students, market participants and the general public to discourage and curb insider trading practices in the Zimbabwean financial markets (Shen, 2008, pp. 41-74; Tsaurai & Odhiambo, 2012, pp. 355-363). Lastly, the SECZ should conclude formal co-operation MOUs with other local, regional and international regulatory bodies to enhance the curbing of insider trading in the Zimbabwean financial markets.

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