



## Considerations of Solving Domestic Crises Derived from the Current Geo-Political Context

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**Abstract:** Mankind has recently witnessed significant developments in the field of confrontations. In the beginnings, the classical, symmetric form of belligerence was used, where armed structures benefiting by a relatively similar potential would carry out the confrontation under the same conditions and circumstances. The next level, that of the asymmetric confrontation, is given by the existence of a geo-political actor using the superior armed forms *versus* another actor, with lower possibilities, which activates the guerrilla methods, subversive actions or fully clandestine actions in terms of applying the strikes. The most recent method, the hybrid confrontation is considered to be the newest and with the highest effect. This method entails the use of a mix of the two types of belligerence, at the same time with an extended information war. The crises from the perspective of the domestic security are mainly situated on the hybrid level, and the respective action pattern may be applied with maximum results in the current context.

**Keywords:** multiple confrontations; geo-political actors; symmetric conflict; asymmetric conflict; hybrid conflict

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## 1. Introduction

Current crises are not novelties. Crises have permanently existed in the ancient or recent history of mankind, yet they have not been defined by the term assigned to them in our days. These events can be considered as ways of failure, of disturbing the internal security of the state, ones intentionally carried out by groups or forces manifesting different hostile interests. The multiplication of their existence and the increase in the harmfulness of the affecting factors, the increase in the possibilities of interference, the radicalization of the hostile factors along with the multitude of extant options – these all do stand for an unpleasant truth of globalization. It must be acknowledged that the increased occurrence of events together with the disappearance of areas that are relatively sheltered from hostile effects can be even further augmented by the very intention and practice of overlapping, corroborating or synchronizing the blows. The harming intentions aim at the possibility to coactively add up the hostile acts of the blows, in order to put in difficulty and to suffocate the intervention capacity of the competent authorities of the state. Therefore, institutions and agencies with responsibilities must cooperate internally, extending exchanges of information with similar structures in other states, be pragmatic, preventive and effective.

## 2. Forms of Internal Confrontations

The current international context is structured on interests and activated by their requirements. Economic and financial interests are at the forefront. The financial aspects contain the tendency to subordinate and outclass the other interests, including the political ones, which were considered as priorities in the not too distant past. In the desire to achieve geopolitical and geostrategic supremacy, in the context of various interferences, national stakeholders will be involved in counteracting multiple factors of damage. Regarding their nature and virulence, factors of damage can have distinct hostile forms - *hard*, *soft* and *smart*. It is known that the *smart* form stands for the combination of the first two forms of manifestation. Details in Table 1.- including the possibilities of activating the *hard*, *soft* and *smart* factors

Table 1. Generic aspects regarding hard, soft and smart factors

<b>TYOLOGY OF THE EVENT</b>	<b>MANIFESTATION FORMS</b>	<b>FINAL EFFECTS GENERATED</b>	<b>INDUCED CONFLICTUALITY</b>
Hard Factors ( <i>Prevailing</i> )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Armed aggression</li> <li>- Frozen conflicts</li> <li>- The enclaving of some territories</li> <li>- Undermining sovereignty</li> <li>- Political-military crises</li> <li>- Coups</li> <li>- The civil war</li> </ul>	Defeating the army of the opposing state	Classic war
Soft Factors ( <i>Prevailing</i> )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Insurgency</li> <li>- Terrorism</li> <li>- Geophysical warfare</li> <li>- Biological warfare</li> <li>- The presence of the "5th column"</li> <li>- Cyber attacks</li> <li>- Endemic corruption</li> <li>- Poor governance</li> <li>- Inflation and financial deadlocks</li> <li>- Extended poverty</li> <li>- Grabbing resources</li> <li>- Affecting the natural environment</li> </ul>	Serious economic and financial compromise	Forms of unconventional warfare
Smart Factors ( <i>Majority</i> )	Complex forms, derived from the combination of hard and soft factors, depending on the strategic interests manifested.	Achieving the pursued geopolitical goals	Forms of hybrid warfare

Source: (Bogdan, 2014, p. 84)

The forms of manifestation presented above may contain multiple forms of action, influence or expression, depending on the intentions of the geopolitical decision-makers, as well as depending on the harming goals considered.

### 2.1. The Symmetrical Conflict

The *hard* form is specific to symmetrical or classic conflicts (such as defensive/offensive, siege fight/exit from siege, retreat/pursuit, etc.). Symmetrical belligerence is well known to be using *hard* forms of expression and design of force (and implicitly of interests) in the geopolitical space, through the military potential.

The conflict involves the development of actions well known to a classical armed conflict. *Hard*-type factors can be found in armed aggressions, territorial losses, local crises and conflicts, the support of terrorism of various forms.





Figure 1. Symmetrical Conflict

In the symmetrical confrontation, the laws, principles and specific rules of conflict are observed (in whole or in part). The politico-military aims and objectives involve large deployments of conventional forces, with causing losses and devastation to various facilities, physical damage to the political, economic and military potential of the opposing state. The classic way of carrying out belligerence acts in their visible form seems to be a show of strength in front of the public. As a priority, the *hard* form of damage considers the defeat of the opponent’s military potential, the seizure of territories, riches or resources. The symmetrical typology can be considered as inadequate to the current moment, primarily because of human losses. However, the symmetrical shape remains one of the last solutions available to the strong. Details in figure 1.

The use of *hard* disruptive methods may be the target of sanctions by the United Nations and other regional security bodies. Due to the visible actions in the international context, geopolitical actors will be under the pressure of public opinion and the disgrace of the democratic world. *Hard* manifestations are relatively undesirable in the practice of geopolitical actors, there being preferred those kinds of efforts and actions which are much better camouflaged i.e. hidden actions.

## 2.2. The Asymmetric Conflict

The asymmetric conflict is specific to damages inherent in the existence and simultaneous use of aggressive forms of armed potential on one side as well as less visible forms on the other. Armed involvements of the belligerent structures belonging to the stronger actor A will be deployed. The asymmetric conflict does not eliminate or replace the range of possible actions by force, the geopolitical actor A using synergistically interconnected measures, forms and actions of political, military, financial, economic, food, demographic, environmental, cybernetic, technological, biological, interethnic, medical, psychological, ethnic nature etc. The actor with limited possibilities (actor B) can have a rather high determination in achieving the strategic objective in time, but with avoiding direct confrontations (a direct conflict with the strong actor A would be devastating for the actor B). Therefore, multiple forms and ingenious variants of harassing the aggressive capacity of the actor with increased military potential will intervene. The actor B considers that achieving the proposed goals will also be possible by avoiding international sanctions. Even the state with increased potential (actor A) will focus on reducing the forms of aggression (in force), there also being used non-military manifestations, mostly specific to counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. Details in figure 2.




**Figure 2. The Asymmetrical Conflict**

Success in asymmetric conflicts must be based on mass support, the existence of a certain political will, as well as on an extended duration.

**2.3. The Hybrid Conflict**

The hybrid conflict or the hybrid warfare (bivalent) considers the development of confrontations through the extensive use of both *hard* and *soft* variants. Scenarios can be varied, but it is important for both parties to use the conventional (classical) as well as the asymmetrical forms. As for the asymmetric conflicts, their intervention might point out at the involvement of a relatively strong geopolitical actor (actor A) that considers the sedimentation of final advantages to the detriment of another actor B, which has a lower potential but has a much higher determination in defending its own interests. The approaches of actor A can be mainly *hard* and *soft*, using the primacy of brute force, as well as financial, technological, biological, economic, environmental, food, cybernetic, medical, psychological, ethnic actions, etc. The actor with fewer possibilities (actor B) will probably use the support and involvement of various non-military entities, which can ensure the clandestine or visible strike of conventional forces belonging to the strong geopolitical actor. The lower the level of the potential geopolitical actor B, the greater will be the use of the means typical of non-classic actions. Details in figure 3.



**Figure 3. The Hybrid Conflict**

In the hybrid conflict, we will witness the broad involvement of special services, paramilitary structures, special operations forces and counterterrorism. Both actors will aspire to a conflict that eliminates the classic forms of belligerence. There will be multiple mutual accusations for escalating the conflict on account of the atypical possibilities.

#### **2.4. Internal Manifestations**

In today's world and society, there can be noticed the state of relative opposition between hostile factors, on the one hand, and government structures, on the other. Who is the winner of that confrontation and who is the loser? It is hard to say, given the value of the stake. Defeats will come to that stakeholder who does not take permanent effort, determination and real involvement to capitalize the support of the target groups within the space considered. Intercessions must enable numerous intervention groups to make a complex effort in the set-up crash cores, with protecting different environments, target groups and facilities.

Crises call for particular possibilities for action. The cosmic ones require an intervention marked by professionalism and coherence. Land crises are massive via their potential for manifestation, their destroying the natural, social or cyber environments and their affecting the human habitat. Climate and meteorological crises are marked by unpredictability and increasing destructive force. Climatic effects are present in conjunction with the meteorological ones, becoming more robust and lengthier. Biological crises are marked by the possibility for rapid dissipation of biological agents within large areas throughout the Globe. Pandemics can be generated for multiple times, in large outbreaks on five continents. Social crises can occur in multiple forms, on account of differences among social groups and undoubtedly reinforced by external impulses. Technological crises are caused by artificial causes, human mistakes or vulnerabilities, and can provide major difficulties.

How can the current crises be solved? Generally valid solutions cannot be provided. Within any crisis there is a common, objective content, and there are differences which characterize the crisis as compared to previous manifestations or specific forms, inherent in the very nature of the crisis itself. Disputes and misunderstandings will have to be resolved rationally, quickly and vigorously, with considering parties in terms of abiding by the principles of legitimacy and correlated with the specific process of planning operations.<sup>1</sup>


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<sup>1</sup> *Manualul de planificare a operațiilor*, Statul Major General, București, / *Operations Planning Manual*, General Staff, Bucharest, 2011, pp. 16-164.

**2.5. Stages of intervention in Internal Crises**

The management of internal security crises is always carried out by the strategic level command (GOLD). The activity of the command (centre) is closely supervised by the political factor (defined as DIAMOND). In fact, DIAMOND is responsible for setting the general framework, implementing appropriate measures, defining the missions of the responsible factors in the territory, determining, allocating or activating logistical support for the crisis. Internal crisis management can be carried out during several phases, such as: notification, preparation, multiple intervention, elimination of outbreaks and restoration of normality (Bogdan, 2015, pp. 214-215).

Stages can be long periods of time which involve the achievement of partial objectives<sup>1</sup>, being subordinated to the general purpose - solving the crisis (Oprea, Botoş & Bogdan, 2014, p. 136). Details in figure 4.



**Figure 4. Stages of Internal Crisis Management**

<sup>1</sup> The duration of the phases is not determined by their length in time, but by the achievement of objectives set for resolving the crisis. (AN).



## 2.6. Notification

The objective of this stage is to achieve the upward flow of information to bring to the attention of the political and administrative factors responsible for the occurrence of the internal security event on the national territory. In order to achieve the goals, official channels of the Ministry of Internal Affairs will be used, as well as other modalities. Speed must be imposed, as the media systems will transmit the information publicly (in real time), so prior to the effort of the structures mandated by the legal framework.

The stage can take around 1-2 hours, and the notification must be short, clear and concise. The short duration derives from the need to simultaneously inform the competent authorities and the extended target groups on the nature, value, strength, place and significance of the event. Clearness requires that the issues raised should be easily perceived by the recipients of the information. Conciseness involves providing data of great interest on the event, with eliminating insignificant or minor aspects.

The notification involves three major sequences: detection, information and warning. The detection will determine exactly the generation and nature of the event. The definite answer must be given to possible questions of interest: *What event was generated? Where and at what time? How is the internal security affected? What is the damaging potential? Which areas are most affected? What damage has been done to human groups (natural environment, cyber environment, livestock, biodiversity)? What measures are needed immediately?* In relation to the answer and implications of these questions, the action from the other stages may occur. In the absence of complete data, in-depth information is not awaited, all available data being liable to arrive successively in line with their occurrence. Essential data will always be transmitted immediately: *what, where, when and how* did it happen?

Reporting will refer to the practical elements of the internal crisis, as well as to the main protection measures to be taken. During the reporting, the level of strategic decision will be notified about other elements regarding the crisis and the surrounding area, as well as regarding the possibilities of damage caused by destructive factors. It also addresses a large and complex social group. Reporting must not trigger panic, there being eliminated all catastrophic visions along with extant media sensationalism. The accuracy of the information will be decisive in resolving the events that occurred.

The warning process will contain efforts possibly directed towards organizational directions. Warning actions will help the command structures along with the forces aimed at producing of the events themselves – actions and forces essential in reaching the acting capacity necessary to fulfil the mission. Warning orders will be issued to the participating forces, according to existing plans. Thus, WARNO (Warning Order), OPLAN (Operation Plan) or OPORD (Operation Order) documents will be used, sent only to those targeted. The warning will also include the possible targets to be damaged together with the target groups (Oprea, Botoş & Bogdan, 2014, pp. 136-139).

At the end of the stage, the DIAMOND, GOLD and SILVERs<sup>1</sup> structures will be informed about the nature and implications of the event, together with BRONZEs, passing to the achievement of high operational capacity. The *Common Operating Picture* (COP) of the event locations will be created. COP will sum up the images of unmanned aerial vehicles (*Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, ISR*), of command as well as ground stationary and mobile means.


At the end of the stage, GOLD will have the detailed elements of the existing operational situation at the affected objective, with informing the population and warning the structures responsible for producing the crisis, making it possible to proceed to staff training and prepare the intervention equipment (Bogdan, 2015, pp. 215-219).

## **2.7. Preparation**

The training shall include measures and actions to increase the feasibility of adequately responding through interventions in crisis areas. The stage duration is estimated at 4-6 hours, and in more difficult situations the duration increases. The stage includes the organization and operational preparation of the use of forces, equipment and means. Given their complexity, actions performed within the target-objective area and on proximal surfaces are significant.

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<sup>1</sup> The particle 's' at the end of certain command structures signifies the existence of multiple such types of commands, adopting the plural form (with 's') of the respective nouns (AN).



**Figure 5. Practical Indication of the Crisis Effort**

In relation to the requirements of the intervention, careful documentation of DIAMOND and GOLD on the nature, evolution and consequences of the crisis is required. Experts on specific fields will be provided, equipment suitable for the crisis will be prepared, the evolution of the crisis will be carefully monitored, and reporting to command/control structures and the media will be operated.

The crisis effort will be focused on lines of effort, which may include: displacement of forces participating in the intervention, migration of equipment for crisis resolution, protection of the population from within the crisis and adjacent space, support of the affected facility, environmental support, others. Strictly necessary lines of effort will be imposed at every crisis, avoiding amateurism. Details in figure 5.


Establishing action courses is an extremely important activity of BRONZEs, in collaboration with SILVERs and GOLD. In principle, three courses of action (CoAs) will be developed: the most likely CoA, the most dangerous CoA and the least dangerous CoA. Balancing courses must be done rationally, with the support of specialists and the involvement of Staff. The accepted CoA will become a decision

support, being increased and completed, according to decision maker’s options (JointChiefs, 2011).

At the end of the phase, GOLD and BRONZE will develop the possibility for implementing the necessary measures to mitigate the crisis, according to the options of specialists and officials. There will be increased the number of specialised and command staff, gear and equipment, in relation to the situation and the requirements of the crisis outbreak.

**2.8. Multiple Intervention**

This stage’s objective is to take and develop comprehensive steps for implementing the decision, able to produce the estimated effects with regard to the internal crisis. The duration of this stage can be of 7 to 8 hours, sometimes increasing to 3 to 4 days or more, depending on the events occurred.



**Figure 6. Crisis Intervention (General Principle)**

*Source:* (Bogdan, 2015, p. 225)

Reactive actions at facilities are pointed out at solving the crisis (specialised human resources, non-specialised personnel, equipment, means and operators) in crisis outbreaks, at establishing cooperation with forces that are present in the extant outbreak, prompt informing on the operational context, achieving cooperation and performing the interventions aimed at the existing crisis.

During the central stage of crisis solving, the effort will focus on four proposed objectives:

- diminishing the hostile action of damaging factors;
- protection of the affected personnel, ensuring staff security;
- imposing multiple logistical support, ensuring the survival and subsistence of the target group affected in the crisis outbreak (accommodation, food, medical care, psychological protection, others);
- restoring the integrity and security of the environment or resources. Details in figure 6.

The inside-outbreak intervention will be carried out at the same time with the efforts from within the adjacent space. At the end of the stage, corresponding to the substantiation, approval and implementation of the action courses aimed at the internal crisis, the intervention of the forces and means for the crisis operation will be certain, according to the GOLD decision (Bogdan, 2015, pp. 224-228).

### ***2.9. Elimination of Outbreaks***

The objective of the stage refers to the implementation of crisis intervention, a priority for reducing human losses and diminishing damage. The stage duration can be of 5 to 8 hours, in difficult situations reaching 3 to 5 days (even longer).

During the stage, activities will be carried out in a practical way, directly within the existing outbreaks. For distinct analytical purposes, the actions of each level (national, operational and tactical) can be presented. Tactical actions require the development of concrete actions at the target objective and in the area near the outbreaks. The effort to reduce losses and diminish the effects of the impact factor is carried out according to GOLD specifications. All along the duration of solving the internal crisis, the practical variants of the intervention will be established by

operators as based on the direct aspects of the crisis, with abiding by the superior decision.

At the end of the stage, we will witness the cut in the virulence of the crisis outbreak, the restoring of security in the affected environment and the facility, as well as the deployment of staff in safe spaces, far from the outbreak. The stage content leads to cutting in damaging effects and putting an end to producing damages, the intervention space becoming permissive to re-establishing ordinary life (Bogdan, 2015, pp. 228-230).

### ***2.10. Restoring Normality***

The stage objective involves measures and actions aimed at reducing the tension, disengaging the forces involved in the intervention, redeploying within their own locations and eliminating damage effects. The stage duration is from 24 to 36 hours, sometimes having a longer duration (48 to 72 hours). Security measures will be maintained as active at the beginning of the stage, they gradually decreasing.

Throughout this stage, we witness the disappearance of destabilizing factors and their actions. The contents of the stage will take into account:

- reduction of the GOLD, SILVER and BRONZE commands set up during the crisis;
- withdrawal of special equipment and platforms from the intervention space;
- resumption of the activity in the affected environment (facility), specific to normal conditions;
- initiating the investigation of competent bodies in the former crisis outbreak;
- directing the intervention groups to their own destinations;
- redeploying intervention structures and the means involved to the disposition locations to which they belong.

The final objective of this stage (crisis management) consists in the return to normal of the activity within the outbreak and the environment along with the affected infrastructure, in the protection of the entire affected population, provided that the forces and means of intervention reach their own locations. The task of holding state authorities accountable is being completed, restoring balance and normality in crisis outbreaks (Bogdan, 2015, pp. 230-232).

### 3. Conclusions

Hostile manifestations are a constant presence in the relations among geopolitical actors (states). The reality of confrontations is driven by the existence of multiple, contradictory and divergent interests. It must be considered that, during the 21<sup>st</sup> century, political implications come second, the economic-financial aspects undoubtedly staying in the foreground. All through the current period, given the entangled nature of conflict forms, the symmetrical and the asymmetrical belligerence are merged resulting in the hybrid belligerence. The state of conflict in the geostrategic proximity of our state are the proof of that duality.

The intervention stages will be constituted as the integrative binder of the efforts taken by the intervention or command structures. The aspects of signalling the events produced internally must trigger the effort of analysis regarding the significance of the changes and actions taken and the establishment of future developments. Immediate or subsequent intervention groups will proceed to very rapid actions, preparations being completed in brief terms. Getting the population out of the range of hostile factors, saving high-value goods and securing the affected areas are of an utmost significance. Multiple intervention requires the division of the involvement effort across all activated outbreaks. Competent structures will take responsibility for the elimination of existing outbreaks, there being utterly important to set up normality, with the integral establishment of internal security aspects.

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